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within the framework of the dividend discount model. Our valuation model incorporates both
managerial exibility and long-run growth. We derive closed-form solutions for the optimal
policies and 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secular growth in a systematic way. A standard parameterization of the model suggests that
the value of the real options can account for more than 8% of the market value of equity, while
the present value of growth opportunities can represent more than 10% of share price. We
also characterize the type of industries where traditional valuation models lead to considerable
underpricing of securities.
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1 Introduction
The traditional dividend discount model (DDM) has been used as one of the main tools for
rm valuation for decades. In its simplest formulation, this methodology consists in projecting
the level of economic activity of the rm in the future years and then discounting the resulting
cash ows to the present. One of the most attractive features of this model is that it dispenses
with any utility specication that would capture the preferences of shareholders over alternative
realizations of dividends.1 Another attractive feature of the model is that it handles long-run
growth (e.g., the Gordon Growth Model). However, the traditional DDM has been criticized
because of its implicit assumption of precommitment to a deterministic plan of action. The fact
that it does not include the value of the real options available to the rm reduces its usefulness
as an asset pricing model in those cases where managerial exibility plays an important role. We
derive a dynamic model in the spirit of the DDM that, while preserving its two main features,
incorporates the value of the real options.
It is implicitly assumed in the canonical DDM that projected cash ows derive from optimal
rm behavior. We develop a dynamic model of the rm with endogenous choice of investment
and leverage ratio that makes explicit the optimizing behavior that supposedly underlies rm
decisions. In doing this, we provide some microeconomic foundations for the widely used DDM.
By using dynamic programming techniques, we are able to introduce managerial exibility into
the model. We interpret the latter as the possibility of the rm to adapt itself to the future
realization of uncertainty. The structural approach we follow allows us to nd analytic formulas
for rm decisions, market value of equity, the real options available to the rm, and long-term
growth. We also ascertain the proportion of share price that is represented by the value of
the real options, as well as by secular growth, and perform comparative statics analysis. We
nally do a cross-sectional study of di¤erent industries that allows us to nd those cases where
managerial exibility and long-run growth play a key role. These are the industries where our
valuation method displays the largest advantage over existing ones. We next elaborate on these
two distinctive components of our model and then describe our main ndings.
1This important simplication is possible due to the Separation Principle. See, for example, Copeland, Weston,
and Shastri (2005).
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The rm in our dynamic model is subject to the inuence of two di¤erent forces: secular
growth and the business cycle. These forces are independent of each other and drive rm decisions.
Long-run growth is a deterministic upward trend that induces the rm to increase its assets by
a constant rate in each period. On the contrary, the business cycle evolves stochastically over
time, consisting in short-term oscillations around the long-run growth trend. The corporate
nance literature has usually modeled these short-term cycles as mean-reverting prot shocks.
During these uctuations, the CEO has the ability to adapt the rm in order to maximize
shareholderswealth; that is, the manager can take advantage of the real options available to the
rm to capitalize on good fortune or to mitigate loss. When prots go up, the manager increases
rm assets to take advantage of the incremental value (the expansion option). Because prots
are persistent, as long as they continue to be high, the CEO will maintain the rm large (the
extension option). After prots go down, the CEO responds by shrinking rm assets to reduce
the impact of bad results (the contraction option). While prot shocks continue to be bad, the
manager postpones new investments, keeping the rm small until better times come (the deferral
option). Moreover, in the extreme case in which the rm experiences zero prots in a period, it
has the possibility to completely stop its operations and wait until prots become positive again
(the switching option). Thus, the real options emerge naturally in our model because the CEO
has the possibility to adjust the rm over the business cycle in order to maximize share price.
Virtually all dynamic programming models of the rm in corporate nance have been devel-
oped without the possibility of long-run growth. In these models, relevant variables take on only
bounded values as they uctuate over time around a long-run constant. These oscillations can
be interpreted as the rm making decisions in order to maximize its value over the business cycle
with no possibility to engage in long-term growth. We contribute to this literature by introducing
unbounded growth into the dynamic model. Many rms have experienced secular growth with
an overlay of short-term cycles. We identify growth with the long-run increment in size of the
rm and not with short-term increases in rm assets resulting from uctuations over the business
cycle. This type of long-run growth might be true for mature, stable rms, such as utilities.
It has been recognized long ago that the traditional DDM undervalues the price of corporate
securities because it does not include the value of managerial exibility. The relevant question
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is, then, by how much. We use the dynamic DDM to ascertain the proportion of share price
that is represented by the value of the real options of the rm, as well as by secular growth.
We parameterize the model with standard values used in the corporate nance literature and
nd that the value of the real options explains around 8% of the market value of equity. If we
consider that in reality the rm also has other real options, such as the exit option, the conclusion
is that the value of managerial exibility can account for a substantial proportion of share price,
which is not considered by the traditional DDM. The present value of growth opportunities is
also an important component that represents another 10% of market equity. Furthermore, both
proportions turn out to be counter-cyclical over the business cycle because the value of the real
options and secular growth are less sensitive to prot shocks than is share price. This result
suggests that the underpricing problem of the traditional DDM is more severe during economic
recessions than expansions. We also nd that these two features are complementary because the
possibility to grow increases the value of the real options.
We nally perform a comparative statics analysis of managerial exibility and secular growth,
as well as a cross-sectional comparison of di¤erent industries. We nd that the elasticity of
the capital input in the production function as well as the volatility and persistence of prot
shocks are the main determinants of the value of the real options. Not surprisingly, we also nd
that the market cost of equity and the growth rate are the two most important determinants
of the present value of the growth opportunities. Because the downward bias in the stock price
produced by standard valuation models depends on the specic rm under study, we characterize
some industries where omitting managerial exibility and/or long-run growth would lead to a
considerable underpricing problem. For instance, we nd that while for rms in the Oil and Gas
Extraction industry not considering the real options would cause a large undervaluation of the
stock price, for corporations in the Chemical industry not taking into account expected future
growth would lead to an analogue problem. We believe that for these types of industries the
model we propose is quite promising.
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1.1 Literature Review
Discounted cash ow models in general, and the DDM in particular, can be traced back to
Williams (1938). Copeland, Weston, and Shastri (2005) and Damodaran (2011), among many
others, present a broad and updated review of the large body of literature about these traditional
valuation models. We contribute to this literature by deriving a dynamic specication of that
canonical model that takes into account the real options available to the rm.
Real options have been studied extensively in the economics and nance literature. Brennan
and Schwartz (1985) use option pricing theory to describe the real options embedded in natural
resource investment projects. McDonald and Siegel (1986) investigate the optimal timing of irre-
versible investments. Pindyck (1988) studies how randomness and irreversibility of investments
impact the value of the real options held by the rm, as well as rms capacity and market value.
Dixit (1989) develops a model of investment decisions with "hysteresis" in a stochastic setting.
Kulatilaka and Marcus (1992) show the systematic undervaluation of investments produced by
the traditional discounted cash ow methodology in the presence of real options. Trigeorgis (1993)
shows how to value the operating options of the rm, such as the option to defer, expand, and
abandon investments. Quigg (1993) uses 2,700 land transactions in Seattle to study the value of
the option to wait to develop the land and nds that the option premium represents, on average,
6% of the value of the land. Moel and Tufano (2002) study 285 decisions to open and close gold
mines in North America and nd that real options models provide better predictions of those
decisions than other methods, such as the traditional discounted cash ow model. Our paper
contributes to these strands of literature by providing a dynamic programming model of the rm
based on the canonical DDM that allows us to calculate the value of managerial exibility in a
systematic manner.
Several papers in corporate nance use dynamic programming models of the rm to explain
results observed by the empirical literature.2 Moyen (2004) studies the sensitivity of rmsin-
vestments to changes in their internally generated funds. Hennessy and Whited (2005) explain
some empirical ndings apparently inconsistent with the trade-o¤ theory, such as market timing.
Hennessy and Whited (2007) estimate the costs of external nance. Moyen (2007) analyzes the
2See Strebulaev and Whited (2012) for a comprehensive review of this literature.
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debt overhang problem in the sense of Myers (1977). Gamba and Triantis (2008) study the value
and optimal management of nancial exibility. Tserlukevich (2008) develop a real options model
to explain stylized facts about leverage behavior. Riddick and Whited (2009) explore the reasons
why rms save cash. Gomes and Schmid (2010) use a real options model to analyze the relation
between capital structure and stock returns. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited (2011) analyze
the opportunity cost of borrowing today in terms of diminished future nancial exibility. We
next relate our work to these papers.
Most of the papers we have just described assume shareholders are risk-neutral. This assump-
tion allows them to use linear utility functions to capture shareholderspreferences. We develop
the dynamic model of the rm within the framework of the DDM, which assumes the Separation
Principle holds and, therefore, does not require any utility specication. According to this prin-
ciple, in the context of a perfect capital market, the manager maximizes the lifetime expected
utility of all current shareholders by maximizing the price of current shares (i.e., shareholders
wealth) independently of their individual subjective preferences. Thus, the CEO needs to know
only the appropriate cost of capital of the rm to use as the discount rate. This property makes
the present model a useful asset pricing tool.3 In addition, our work di¤ers from the extant liter-
ature on dynamic programming models of the rm in that we allow for long-run growth. As we
show in our study, incorporating this feature into the model is important for rms where growth
opportunities account for a large part of the stock price, such as companies in the Chemical in-
dustry. On the other hand, the previous papers contain other realistic features (i.e., diverse kinds
of frictions, such as costly adjustment of capital, costly issuance of debt and/or equity, etc.) that
we omit in this work. These features could be, nevertheless, easily introduced into the present
model for asset pricing purposes. Even if the resulting model loses the closed-form, it could still
be used to price securities properly and make meaningful quantitative (i.e., not only directional)
predictions about rm decisions in the context of counter-factual policy analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we obtain a dynamic version of the DDM
that accounts for real options by applying dynamic programming. In Section 3, we separate the
di¤erent components of market value of equity and study the economic importance of the real
3Dixit and Pindyck (1994) suggest this possibility for dynamic programming models of the rm.
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options as well as long-run growth. The comparative statics analysis of the di¤erent components
of share price and the cross-sectional study are in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. Appendix 1
contains propositions and proofs, while Appendix 2 describes the construction of model variables
and calibration of model parameters.
2 A Dynamic Real Options Model of the Stock Price
In this section, we propose a dynamic valuation model that incorporates two key aspects of the
rm, namely, managerial exibility and secular growth. We view our model as a dynamic version
of the standard DDM that could be used as a powerful valuation tool.
We use dynamic programming as the solution concept to derive the optimal policies as well
as the market value of equity.4 In our model, time is discrete and the rm makes decisions at
the end of every period (e.g., quarter, year, etc.) The life horizon of the rm is innite, which
implies that shareholders believe it will run forever. The risk-free rate of interest in the economy
is indicated by rf .
The CEO makes investment and nancing decisions such that the market value of equity is
maximized. Variable eKt represents the book value of assets in period t.5 The assets of the rm eKt
will vary (i.e., increase or decrease) over time, reecting the investment decisions. In each period,
installed capital depreciates at constant rate  > 0. The debt of the rm in period t, eDt, matures
in one period and is rolled over at the end of every period. We assume the coupon rate cB equals
the market cost of debt rB, which implies that book value of debt eDt equals market value of debteBt.6 The amount of outstanding debt eBt will increase and decrease over time according to debt
decisions. We assume the rm establishes leverage ratio `t 2 [0; 1) as the maximum proportion
of book assets that might be nanced with debt such that it remains risk-free during all of the
rms life. Therefore, the rm can always repay its debt in full, and the market cost of debt rB
equals the risk-free interest rate rf .
4Specically, we use discrete-time, innite-horizon, stochastic dynamic programming.
5The tilde on eX indicates that variable X is growing over time.
6 It is straightforward to generalize this component and assume a coupon rate cB di¤erent from the market cost
of debt rB . Without any loss of generality and to simplify notation, we assume they are equal.
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We introduce randomness to the model through the prot shock zt. It is common in the
corporate nance literature to assume that random shocks follow an AR(1) process in logs:
ln (zt) = ln (c) +  ln (zt 1) + "t (1)
where  2 (0; 1) is the autoregressive parameter that denes the persistence of prot shocks. In
other words, a high  makes periods of high prot innovations (e.g., economics expansions) and
low prot shocks (e.g., recessions) last more on average, and vice versa. The innovation term "t
is assumed to be an iid normal random variable with mean 0 and variance 2. Constant c > 0
is a drift in logs that scales the moments of the distribution of zt and has a direct impact on
the expected protability of the rm.7 These assumptions result in lognormal conditional and
unconditional distributions for prot shocks.8
Gross prots in period t are dened by the following function:
eGt = (1 + g)t(1 ) zt eKt (2)
where zt is the prot shock in period t and parameter  2 (0; 1) represents the elasticity of
capital input. The level of technology in period t takes the form (1 + g)t(1 ), which implies
the rm grows at rate g  0 in each period. The exponent (1  ) makes the payo¤ function
(dividends) homogeneous of degree-1 in growing variables, which is required to obtain constant
long-run growth. Otherwise, the problem is ill-dened for that purpose. With this property,
growing cash ows remain proportional to the market value of equity (the value function) and
the rm becomes a scaled up replica of itself over time. This representation could be interpreted
as technological change happening at a constant rate. Equation (2) says that gross prots depend
on a prot innovation and a Cobb-Douglas production function with decreasing returns to scale
in capital input. For existence of market value of equity, we impose the usual restriction that
the secular growth rate must be lower than the market cost of equity (i.e., g < rS). This market
cost of equity is an exogenous rate that reects the risk of the stock price. Subtracting operating
costs f eKt (with f > 0) and depreciation  eKt from gross prots gives the rms earnings before
7The usual assumption in the literature is c = 1, which makes term ln (c) disappear from equation (1).
8Lazzati and Menichini (2013a) describe the steady-state of the model in closed-form.
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interest and taxes in period t:
eEt = (1 + g)t(1 ) zt eKt   f eKt    eKt: (3)
Corporate earnings are taxed at rate  . Therefore, the rms net prots in period t are
eNt =  eEt   rB eBt (1  ) : (4)
With all the previous information, we can state the accounting cash ow equation or, equivalently,
the cash ow that the rm pays to equity-holders in period t as
eLt = eNt + eKt   eBt   eKt+1 + eBt+1: (5)
Equation (5) is usually called the levered cash ow of the rm and implies that the dividend
paid to shareholders in period t equals net prots minus the fraction of capital change that is
nanced with equity. Given the current state of the rm at t = 0,
 eK0; eB0; z0, the problem of
the CEO is to choose an innite sequence of functions
n eKt+1  eKt; eBt; zt ; eBt+1  eKt; eBt; zto1
t=0
,
where zt is the future prot shock in period t for all t > 0, such that the market value of equity
is maximized. Accordingly, the stock price can be expressed as







where E0 is the expectation operator given information at t = 0 (i.e., z0). Due to the introduction
of long-run growth to the model, we need to normalize growing variables before proceeding with
the maximization. Let vector eXt = n eKt; eBt; eGt; eEt; eNt; eLt; eSto contain the growing variables of
the model. Then, we transform vector eXt in the following way: Xt = eXt=(1 + g)t.
Finally, using the normalized variables and modifying the discount factor accordingly, the
market value of equity can be expressed as









Equation (7) provides some microfoundations for the canonical Gordon Growth Model in the
stochastic setting. We obtain closed-form solutions for this problem by solving the Bellman
equation associated to expression (7). We let variables with primes indicate values in the next
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period while normalized variables with no primes indicate current values (e.g., if we are at period
zero, then next-period assets are K 0 = K1 (K0; B0; z0) and current assets are K = K0). Then,
the Bellman equation for the rm problem in equation (7) is given by










K 0; B0; z0
 jz : (8)
We solve equation (8) by using the usual backward induction argument, and the optimal





z0jz 11  W  and B0 = `K 0 (9)
where E [z0jz] = cze 122 is the conditional expectation of the prot shock in the next period given







is the time-invariant part of optimal capital
and ` = 1 (f+)(1 )1+rB(1 ) is the maximum (and optimal) book leverage ratio consistent with risk-free
debt. This last ratio is constant over time and represents the target leverage of the rm. It shows
the level of debt that maximizes the benets of the tax shields while it keeps debt risk-free. Note
that ` is (strictly) less than 1.
Equation (9) suggests that optimal capital increases with parameter  and the expected prot
shock E [z0jz]. As  goes up, the concavity of the production function with respect to capital input
diminishes and the marginal productivity (and protability) of capital increases.9 The expected
prot shock increases with parameter c, current prot shock z, and volatility of innovations ,
which make the rm increase its optimal assets to take more advantage of their higher expected
protability. The e¤ect of the persistence parameter  on expected prots depends on the value
of current prot shock z. When z > 1, expected prots grow with , while the opposite is true
when z < 1.10 A negative e¤ect occurs with the four parameters in the denominator of W . A
larger market cost of equity rS decreases the present value of future periodsprots and the rm
invests less. Higher income taxes  , operating costs f , and depreciation  reduce the protability
of capital and the rm diminishes optimal assets accordingly. The fact that nancing decisions
9The positive e¤ect of  on optimal capital is always true when E [z0jz] > 1, while it depends on W  when
E [z0jz] < 1.
10For standard values of the parameters, the invariant unconditional mean of prot shocks E [z] is slightly above
1. Specically, Table II shows that E [z] = 1:05. Thus, the event z < 1 is fairly frequent.
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do not a¤ect investing decisions and optimal capital is consistent with the Modigliani-Miller
assumptions.
Returning to the previous notation with growing variables, where next-period assets areeKn+1  eKn; eBn; zn and current-period assets are eKn, the solution of the Bellman equation leads
to the following general formulation of the dynamic DDM:
Optimal rm decisions:
eKn+1 (zn) = (1 + g)n+1E [zn+1jzn] 11  W  and eBn+1 (zn) = ` eKn+1 (zn) : (10)
Market value of equity:
eSn  eKn; eBn; zn = zn eKn   f eKn    eKn   rB eBn (1  ) + eKn   eBn + (1 + g)nMnP  (11)
where the rst three terms on the right-hand side represent the (after-shock) book value of equity,






























and represents the discounted sum of unconditional means of prot shocks. The general term








0@c 1 t1  ztn e 122 (1 2t)(1 2) 1(1 )
1A 11  (13)
and indicates the expected prot shock t periods from today given current innovation zn.11




   fW    W    rB`W 

(1  )  rSW  (1  `) (14)
11We obtain Mn in the following way. Let A0 = 0 and, for t = 1; 2; :::;



















and denotes the (average) dollar return on equity minus the (average) dollar cost of equity at the
optimum. Appendix 1 shows that P  is (strictly) positive.
It is important to highlight that equation (11) deals with two independent aspects of growth,
namely, past and future growth. The assumption that the rm is at an arbitrary current period
t = n implies that it has been running and growing for the past n periods. Thus, past growth
refers to the n periods of growth that the rm has accumulated since the beginning of its life
(at t = 0), which enters share price through (1 + g)n. On the contrary, future growth refers to
the growth opportunities that the rm expects to have in the future and enters the stock price
through Mn. Specically, future growth appears as (1 + g) on the numerator of the discount
factor in Mn. This distinction between past and future growth plays a fundamental role in the
decomposition of share price that we perform in Section 3.
A nice property of dynamic programming models is that they treat rms as forward-looking
agents and, thus, the market value of equity reects not only current prot innovation but also
the whole future sequence of expected prot shocks. This feature of the model is captured by
variable Mn.
The market value of equity in equation (11) corresponds to the so-called Flow-to-Equity
method of rm valuation. Lazzati and Menichini (2013b) describe those formulas in the context
of other popular rm valuation methods, such as Weighted Average Cost of Capital and Adjusted
Present Value.
In the next section, we decompose the stock price in its four primitive components and present
the model predictions regarding managerial exibility and secular growth.
3 The Value of Real Options and Long-Run Growth
As we mentioned before, one of the main disadvantages of the canonical DDM is that it does
not consider managerial exibility. It assumes that, at the beginning of the rms life, the CEO
projects the expected level of activity for all future periods and determines the required level of
assets and debt for each of those periods in order to maximize shareholderswealth. Then the
rm is implicity assumed to follow that path of action passively, ignoring the fact that managers
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can react to future changes in the environment and make decisions to take advantage of good
fortune or to alleviate loss. In this section, we investigate the economic importance of such
undervaluation, as well as the relevance of the long-run growth opportunities. To this end, we
rst decompose the market value of equity into its primitive determinants, namely, the stock
price with no managerial exibility and no future growth opportunities, the value of the real
options, the value of long-run growth, and the value of the interaction e¤ect between the last two
components. We then use parameter estimates that are standard in the literature to quantify
each of these terms for a representative rm.
The aforementioned decomposition requires us to derive the stock price under di¤erent as-
sumptions. First, we obtain the market value of equity for a rm that grows but ignores manage-
rial exibility. We do this by solving the problem of the rm in equation (6) with simultaneous
optimization instead of dynamic programming techniques. That is, we assume the rm applies
the expectation operator to all future cash ows rst (conditioning on current prot shock z0)
and then maximizes the resulting objective function with respect to all decision variables at once.
Because this optimization concept maximizes a deterministic stream of payo¤s (i.e., the expected
levered cash ows), it captures the assumption of precommitment to a deterministic plan of ac-
tion that is embedded in the traditional DDM. This is equivalent to the CEO choosing an innite
sequence of functions
n eKt+1  eK0; eB0; z0 ; eBt+1  eK0; eB0; z0o1
t=0
, where z0 is the realization of
the current prot shock, such that the market value of equity is maximized. What in the previous
section was an innite sequence of stochastic functions that depended on future prot shock zt,
now is an innite sequence of deterministic functions that depend on current (realized) prot
shock z0. Saying it di¤erently, the traditional DDM computes maximums of expec-
tations while the real options approach calculates expectations of maximums. With
these assumptions, the problem of the rm in equation (6) becomes
eS0  eK0; eB0; z0
WO
= max







The subindex WO highlights that the solution corresponds to a rm without real options (but
with growth). The solution to this problem is




zn eKn   f eKn    eKn   rB eBn (1  ) + eKn   eBn + (1 + g)n cMnP  (16)
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1  + ::: (17)
and the general term is










The market value of equity in equation (11) di¤ers from that of equation (16) via terms Mn
and cMn. In particular, Mn captures the value of managerial exibility, which is absent in cMn.
Because the rm in the last model ignores the real options, the market value of equity in equation
(11) is always greater than that of equation (16).
Second, we derive the stock price for a rm that has managerial exibility but does not have
the possibility to grow in the future. We obtain this value from equation (11) assuming g = 0 in
the discount factor:

































The subindex WG means that the solution corresponds to a rm without future growth oppor-
tunities (but with managerial exibility). Note that while equation (19) does not include the
present value of future growth opportunities, it does consider the impact of the n periods of past
growth.
We nally nd the share price of a rm that ignores managerial exibility and does not have
possibilities of future growth. This value is obtained from equation (16) assuming g = 0 in the
discount factor:
















1  + ::: (22)
Equation (21) represents the part of share price that depends purely on the expected protability
of the rms assets. The subindex AP refers to the fact that this part of the stock price is
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explained by the value of assets in place. As with equation (19), while eSn  eKn; eBn; zn
AP
does
not include the present value of future growth opportunities, it does include the n accumulated
periods of past growth.
Next, we derive the di¤erent components of share price using the previous formulas. The
value of the real options is given by
eOn (zn) = eSn  eKn; eBn; zn
WG
  eSn  eKn; eBn; zn
AP





That is, the present value of managerial exibility equals the market value of equity of a rm that
takes advantage of the real options but does not expect to grow in the future minus the stock
price of a rm with no managerial exibility and no future growth.
The value of long-run growth results from
eGn (zn) = eSn  eKn; eBn; zn
WO
  eSn  eKn; eBn; zn
AP
= (1 + g)n
cMn  MnP : (24)
Equation (24) means that the present value of secular growth equals the market value of equity
of a rm with no managerial exibility but with the possibility to grow in the future minus the
stock price of a rm with no real options and no future growth.
We nally compute the value of the interaction e¤ect between managerial exibility and
growth as a residual in the following way:
eIn (zn) = eSn  eKn; eBn; zn  heSn  eKn; eBn; zn
AP
+ eOn (zn) + eGn (zn)i







cMn  MnP : (25)
Term eIn (zn) can be interpreted as the impact of growth on the value of the real options.12 The
rm increases its assets over time as a consequence of growth, and the value of its future real
options goes up accordingly. Moreover, in Section 4 we do a comparative statics analysis and







cMn  Mn, which is an innite


















  E [zn+tjzn] 11 

:
This expression shows why eIn (zn) represents an interaction e¤ect between the two components: the rst factor
reects the pure impact of growth while the second factor denotes the sole inuence of the real options.
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show that a higher growth rate augments the value of the real options. Appendix 1 generalizes
this result showing that the interaction term is (weakly) positive.
In summary, the previous formulas suggest the market value of equity with dynamic program-
ming can be decomposed as follows.
Primitive decomposition of the stock price:
eSn  eKn; eBn; zn = eSn  eKn; eBn; zn
AP
+ eOn (zn) + eGn (zn) + eIn (zn) : (26)
We next analyze the relevance of these components of share price for a representative rm. Table
I contains the values we use for each of the model parameters. These values are standard in the
corporate nance literature. We let parameter c be 1, which is the norm in the literature. The
autoregressive parameter () is set at 0.75 while the standard deviation of the innovation term
() equals 0.20. These parameter values are close to the estimates of DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and
Whited (2011). We choose the curvature of the production function () to be 0.65, which is close
to the parameter estimate of Hennessy and Whited (2007). Both the operating costs (f) and
the depreciation rate of capital () are set equal to 0.10. Finally, we x the corporate income
tax rate () at 0.35, the market cost of debt (rB) at 0.02 (which equals the risk-free interest
rate rf ), the market cost of equity (rS) at 0.08, and the long-run growth rate (g) at 0.01. This
parameterization is consistent with a yearly period.
We assume that the rm is at the outset of its life (i.e., t = 0) and the current state eK0; eB0; z0 is at the mean of the stationary unconditional distribution of prot shocks:
z0 = E [z] , eK0 = E [z] 11  W , and eB0 = ` eK0 (27)
where







Table II exhibits the values of the current state
 eK0; eB0; z0 according to equation (27). These
variables are constructed with the parameter values described in Table I and used in the parame-
terization of the di¤erent dynamic models we described above. Table II also shows that optimal
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book leverage ratio (`) is 0.86. As we explained in Section 2, this ratio is the target leverage of
the rm and is a constant that depends only on primitive parameters.13
Next we present the main quantitative results of this section. Table III shows that the
market value of equity, eS0  eK0; eB0; z0, is 26.24. The value of the real options, eO0 (z0), is 2.23
and represents 8.48% of share price. Considering that in reality the rm has more real options
than the ones included in eS0  eK0; eB0; z0, such as the exit option, the conclusion is that the
value of managerial exibility explains an important fraction of the stock price. Firm value,eB0 + eS0  eK0; eB0; z0, turns out to be 33.46 and the real options represent 6.65% of that value.
This proportion is close to the 6% reported by Quigg (1993) as the value of the land explained
by the option to wait to develop. The value of long-run growth, eG0 (z0), is 2.77 and explains
10.57% of the market value of equity as well as 8.29% of rm value. The interaction term between
managerial exibility and growth has a value of 0.40 and represents 1.51% and 1.18% of share
price and rm value, respectively.
Fact 1: Overall, managerial exibility plus secular growth represent around 20% of share price
and 16% of the value of the rm.
One of the main methodological contributions of the present article is to introduce the possi-
bility to engage in long-term growth. Figure 1 displays the stochastic evolution over time of the
market value of equity, eSn  eKn; eBn; zn, for a rm that grows (g = 0:01). The model is simulated
over 100 periods (i.e., years) starting at moment t = 0. The parameterization of the model uses
the values in Table I and the initial state
 eK0; eB0; z0 is as described in equation (27), with the
values shown in Table II. The solid dotted line shows the stochastic path of market equity for
the growing rm. This dotted line oscillates around an exponential solid line that represents the
long-run growth trend. As benchmark, we added a dashed line that represents the share price
of the same rm when it does not grow (i.e., g = 0). The horizontal solid line around which
this dashed line uctuates is the mean of the stationary distribution of share price. Because
both simulations are created for the same resolution of uncertainty, the dotted and dashed lines
exhibit the same peaks and troughs over time. The only di¤erence between the two rms is the
13Lazzati and Menichini (2013c) study the capital structure implications of this type of models.
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assumption about growth. All four lines are normalized by the rst value in the simulation of
market equity for the no-growth rm.
Figure 2 shows the evolution over time of the stock price (solid line with dots), the value of
managerial exibility (solid line), the present value of growth opportunities (dashed line), and the
value of the interaction e¤ect between the real options and growth (dotted line). The simulation
in this gure uses the same sequence of prot shocks used to construct market value of equity in
Figure 1 and the four lines are normalized by the rst value of the corresponding time series. We
next highlight the main feature of Figure 2.
Fact 2: The stock price is considerably more sensitive to prot shocks than are the real options,
secular growth, and the interaction term.
The reason for this di¤erent behavior is that the stock price, eSn  eKn; eBn; zn, receives the full
impact of zn through Mn. On the contrary, zn enters eOn (zn), eGn (zn), and eIn (zn) through
4
Mn   Mn, cMn   Mn, and Mn   4Mn   cMn  Mn, respectively, and these subtractions
reduce the inuence of prot shocks.
In Figure 3, we can observe how the proportion of share price explained by managerial ex-
ibility (solid line), long-run growth (dashed line), and the interaction e¤ect (dotted line) evolve
over time. This simulation is also based on the same realization of uncertainty of Figure 1. We
next summarize the main result in Figure 3.
Fact 3: The proportions of share price explained by managerial exibility, long-run growth, and
the interaction e¤ect are counter-cyclical. That is, when prot shocks are high, the fraction of
market equity explained by each of those terms falls and vice versa.
This pattern is due to the di¤erent sensitivities to prot shocks described in Figure 2 and suggests
that both managerial exibility and growth opportunities are more important during economic
recessions than expansions. In other words, the undervaluation problem of the traditional DDM
is exacerbated during periods of low prots shocks. Figure 4 exhibits the same three proportions
but with respect to rm value, and the conclusions are the same.
In Section 4, we elaborate on the key determinants of the primitive components of the stock
price and perform a cross-sectional comparison of di¤erent industries.
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4 Comparative Statics and Cross-Sectional Analysis
In the previous section, we showed that the value of the real options is sensitive to the uctuations
of the business cycle. Now we show that this value is also sensitive to the primitive characteristics
of the rm. For instance, Quigg (1993) nds that the mean value of the option to wait to
invest is 6% of the value of the land, ranging from 1% to 30% according to land characteristics.
Accordingly, in Subsection 4.1, we do a comparative statics analysis of relevant model variables,
while in Subsection 4.2, we perform a cross-sectional analysis for di¤erent SIC industries.
4.1 Comparative Statics
We study how market value of equity, eS0  eK0; eB0; z0, and the proportion of share price explained
by the real options, eO0 (z0) =eS0  eK0; eB0; z0, and by long-run growth, eG0 (z0) =eS0  eK0; eB0; z0,
vary when we change the base case parameter values by up to  20%. The analytic solutions
make it easy to understand the relative impact of the di¤erent model parameters on these terms.
Briey, we nd that while the stock price and the value of the real options are very sensitive
to the curvature of the production function (), the present value of growth opportunities is
very sensitive to both the market cost of equity (rS) and (naturally) the growth rate (g). The
persistence of prot shocks () is also an important determinant of the value of managerial
exibility. We next elaborate on these results.
We assume again that the rm is at the beginning of its life (i.e., t = 0). Table IV displays how
market equity value changes with di¤erent parameterizations of the model. One of the most
important parameters is the curvature of the production function (). The higher
this parameter, the higher the marginal productivity of capital, which allows the rm to increase
optimal assets to take more advantage of prot shocks. A 20% increment in the value of  (i.e.,
from 0.65 to 0.78) increases market value of equity by a factor of 6 from 26.24 to 170.25. Another
important parameter is the drift in logs (c), which scales the moments of the distribution of prot
shocks. The importance of this parameter stems from the fact that it has a direct impact on the
mean protability of the rm. When c increases from 1 to 1.2, share price goes up from 26.24
to 150.69, an almost 6 times increment. The other parameters a¤ect market equity to a lesser
extent, with persistence of prot shocks () and market cost of equity (rS) at the top of this
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second group.
Table V exhibits the comparative statics analysis of the fraction of market equity explained
by managerial exibility. It is clear that the elasticity of capital input () has a signicant
inuence on the value of the real options, specially on the expansion and contraction
options. The possibility of the CEO to take advantage of high prots and to protect shareholders
from bad earnings by adapting rm size is more valuable when the curvature of the production
function is lower. For the base case parameter value of  = 0:65, managerial exibility represents
8.48% of market equity, percentage that increases to 25.24% when  goes up to 0.78. For the
same reasons, the volatility of prot shocks () also has a considerable inuence on the value of
the real options. The higher the variability of prot shocks, the more the rm can benet from
having the possibility to adapt itself to changes in the environment. When  goes up from the
base case value of 0.2 to 0.24, the fraction of share price represented by real options increases
from 8.48% to 12.08%.
The persistence of prot shocks () also plays a major role in the valuation of real
options. Economic expansions and recessions are longer on average when prot shocks are more
persistent, and the value of managerial exibility increases, specially the value of the extension
and deferral options. The reason for this result is that the CEO is able to mantain the rm large
during periods of high earnings and keep it small during periods of low prot shocks. A 20%
increase of  from 0.75 to 0.9 augments the proportion of real options from 8.48% to 22.42%. The
other model parameters have a smaller e¤ect on this proportion.
Finally, the impact of di¤erent parameter values on the proportion of market equity explained
by long-run growth appears in Table VI. As expected, the market cost of equity (rS) and the
growth rate (g) are among the most important parameters. A 20% reduction in the value
of rS (i.e., from 0.08 to 0.064) increases the proportion of secular growth from 10.57% to 13.38%
while a 20% increase in the value of g (i.e., from 0.01 to 0.012) augments the fraction of long-run
growth from 10.57% to 12.69%. Similar in importance is the drift in logs (c), which strongly
a¤ects the expected protability of the rm. When c increases from 1 to 1.2, the proportion of
secular growth goes up from 10.57% to 13.84%. The other model parameters play a smaller role
regarding this proportion.
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In the next subsection, we compare the importance of real options and long-run growth across
industries that sharply di¤er regarding key parameter values, such as the elasticity of capital
input.
4.2 Cross-Sectional Analysis
In this subsection, we extend our previous results by comparing the relevance of the real options
and growth opportunities across di¤erent SIC industries. In particular, we focus on three indus-
tries that display considerably di¤erent capital elasticity according to Jones (2003). We choose
Oil and Gas Extraction (OGE) as an industry with high capital elasticity ( = 0:75), Printing
and Publishing (PP) as an industry with low capital elasticity ( = 0:25), and Chemicals (C) as
an industry between those two extremes ( = 0:50). We compute the other parameters for each
industry using Compustat data and show their values in Table VII. Appendix 2 describes the
data items used to construct model variables as well as the procedure employed to calibrate the
parameters for each industry.
Table VIII exhibits our main ndings. OGE rms have the greatest proportion of share price
explained by managerial exibility, 10.15%, while C rms are in second place with 4.69% and PP
rms are third with 1.28%. Although these industries exhibit considerable variation in the values
of all other parameters, the curvature of the production function () remains as the main driver
of the value of the real options, as it denes how much the CEO can take advantage of the future
business cycles. For instance, PP rms have a substantially higher persistence of prot shocks
() than OGE rms do, but the proportion of share price explained by managerial exibility
is roughly 8 times less as a consequence of their lower elasticity of capital. These ndings are
consistent with the results in the previous subsection.
Finally, it is noticeable the impact of the growth rate (g) on the present value of growth
opportunities. OGE rms have a modest growth rate of 0.43% per year, which explains 4.93% of
the stock price. On the contrary, C rms, with a growth rate of 3.47% per year, have 35.46% of
their stock price explained by future growth opportunities. Between these two extremes are PP
rms with a growth rate of 2.51% per year, which explains 26.74% of share price.
In summary, for industries such as OGE, which display low curvature of the production func-
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tion, valuation methods that omit managerial exibility (e.g., the traditional DDM) substantially
underprice share price. Similarly, for industries such as C, which experience considerable growth
over time, models of stock valuation that do not incorporate the possibility of secular growth (e.g.,
most of the existing dynamic programming models of the rm) produce an important downward
bias in the estimates. We conclude that for these cases the valuation model we derive
in this article displays the largest benets.
5 Conclusion
We derive a dynamic model of the rm within the framework of the dividend discount model
(DDM). The model we propose includes two important features: real options and secular growth.
The introduction of the real options is an improvement with respect to the traditional DDM,
which assumes precommitment to a deterministic decision plan and, therefore, does not consider
managerial exibility. The introduction of secular growth enhances the existing dynamic pro-
gramming models of the rm in corporate nance, which so far have been developed assuming
the rm does not have long-run growth opportunities. Furthermore, being based on the Sepa-
ration Principle, our model does not require any assumption about shareholderspreferences, as
long as market discount rates are available. We believe all these feaures make our dynamic model
a useful asset pricing tool.
The introduction of real options and secular growth into the valuation model is essential to
value the rm correctly. By decomposing the stock price in its primitive components, we are
able to quantify for di¤erent industries the magnitude of the underpricing problem created by
neglecting those features. For instance, we nd that for rms in the Oil and Gas Extraction
industry the proportion of share price explained by managerial exibility can easily exceed 10%.
Thus, valuation models such as the traditional DDM would lead to a large underpricing of this
type of rms. Analogously, we nd that for rms in the Chemical industry more than 30% of their
stock price can be explained by future growth opportunities. Then, employing valuation models
that do not handle long-run growth would produce severely undervalued estimates. Finally, we
nd that the proportions of share price represented by both managerial exibility and secular
growth are counter-cyclical, which suggests that the aforementioned undervaluation problems
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become aggravated during economic recessions.
There are several ways to extend the present dynamic DDM, the most obvious one being the
addition of other real life features as described in the comprehensive review of Strebulaev and
Whited (2012). Another promising research direction is to nd assumptions that allow us to
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6 Appendix 1: Propositions and Proofs
Proposition 1 At the optimum, the (average) dollar return on equity minus the (average) dollar
cost of equity is (strictly) positive. That is
P  > 0: (29)
Proof We need to show that the following inequality is true:
 
W 
   fW    W    rB`W 

(1  )  rSW  (1  `) > 0 (30)
which can be reformulated as
 <
rS
1  + f + 
rS





Given that  2 (0; 1) and the right-hand side is greater than or equal to 1, the last inequality
is true, which completes the proof.
Proposition 2 The interaction e¤ect between managerial exibility and growth is (weakly) pos-
itive. That is eIn (zn)  0: (32)






cMn  Mn  0 is true. Then, the proof consists in showing that all terms in
























The rst factor can be rearranged as (1+g)
t 1
(1+rS)
t and, because 0  g < rS , it is (weakly) positive.
The second factor is also nonnegative and, in order to prove this, we need to show that, for all t,
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0@c 1 t1  ztn e 122 (1 2t)(1 2)
1A 11  : (35)








(1  2)  0: (36)
Given that  > 0,  2 (0; 1), and  2 (0; 1), the last inequality is true, which completes the
proof.
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7 Appendix 2: Model Variable Construction and Parameter Cal-
ibration
We need to nd parameter values for c; ; ; f; ;  ; rB; rS ; and g for each of the three industries
(parameter  for each group of rms was dened above). We calibrate the model using Compustat
annual data for all rms in each of the three SIC codes (i.e., Oil and Gas Extraction (OGE) is SIC
13, Printing, Publishing, and Allied Products (PP) is SIC 27, and Chemicals and Allied Products
(C) is SIC 28). The sample includes 9,476 rm-years for the OGE industry, 1,859 rm-years for
the PP industry, 11,162 rm-years for the C industry, and covers the period 1990-2013.
In order to obtain parameter f , we average the ratio Selling, General, and Administrative
Expense (XSGA)/Assets - Total (AT) for all rm-years in each industry. We follow the same
procedure to get  as the ratio of Depreciation and Amortization (DP) over Assets - Total (AT),
and  as the fraction Income Taxes - Total (TXT)/Pretax Income (PI). We obtain parameters
c; ; and  for each industry using the rms autoregressive prot shock process of equation (1)
and the gross prots equation (2). The data we use with these equations are Gross Prot (GP)
and Assets - Total (AT). We keep the assumption that the risk-free interest rate (rf = rB) is
0.02. We derive rS using CAPM with the corresponding industry betas estimated by Fama and
French (1997) and assuming an expected market return (rM ) of 0.08. Finally, we obtain g for
each industry from Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000).
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Figure 1. Simulation of market value of equity. The model is simulated over 100 periods
(years) with the parameterization described in Section 3. The gure exhibits the evolution over time of
the market value of equity of a rm that grows in the long-run (solid line with dots). The gure also shows
the random path of the stock price for the same rm when it does not grow (dashed line). In both cases,
overlaying market equity is the secular growth trend (solid lines). All values are normalized by the rst
observation of the no-growth share price.
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Figure 2. Simulation of market value of equity, real options, and long-run growth. The
model is simulated over 100 periods (years) with the parameterization described in Section 3. The gure
exhibits the evolution over time of market value of equity (solid line with dots), managerial exibility (solid
line), secular growth (dashed line), and the interaction term (dotted line). The four lines are normalized
by the rst observation of the corresponding time series.
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Figure 3. Simulation of the proportion of real options and long-run growth. The model
is simulated over 100 periods (years) with the parameterization described in Section 3. The gure exhibits
the evolution over time of the proportion of market value of equity explained by managerial exibility
(solid line), secular growth (dashed line), and the interaction term (dotted line).
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Figure 4. Simulation of the proportion of real options and long-run growth. The
model is simulated over 100 periods (years) with the parameterization described in Section 3. The gure
exhibits the evolution over time of the proportion of rm value explained by managerial exibility (solid
line), secular growth (dashed line), and the interaction term (dotted line).
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Table I
Base Case Parameter Values
The table presents the values used to parameterize the base case of the dynamic dividend discount model.
The parameters are the drift in logs (c), the persistence of prot shocks (), the standard deviation of the
innovation term (), the concavity of the production function (), the operating costs (f), the capital
depreciation rate (), the corporate income tax rate (), the market cost of debt (rB), the market cost of
equity (rS), and the growth rate (g).
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Table II
Parameterization of the Current State of the Dynamic Dividend Discount
Model
The table shows the base case parameterization of the current state of the dynamic dividend discount
model. The variables are the mean of the invariant unconditional distribution of prot shocks (E [z]), the
part of optimal assets that is constant with respect to the passage of time (W ), optimal book leverage
ratio (`), and the current state of capital
 eK0, debt  eB0, and prot shocks (z0).
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Table III
Value of Market Equity, Real Options, and Long-Run Growth
The table exhibits the base case results for the dynamic dividend discount model. The variables are
the market value of equity with no real options and no future growth, eS0  eK0; eB0; z0
AP
; the value
of the real options, eO0 (z0); the value of long-run growth, eG0 (z0); the interaction term between man-
agerial exibility and growth, eI0 (z0); the market value of equity with managerial exibility and long-run
growth, eS0  eK0; eB0; z0; optimal next-period assets, eK1 (z0); optimal next-period debt, eB1 (z0); current
debt, eB0; and the market value of the rm, eB0 + eS0  eK0; eB0; z0.
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Table IV
Sensitivity Analysis of Market Equity Value
The table shows share price, eS0  eK0; eB0; z0, for di¤erent values of model parameters. The column
labeled Base Case contains the base case parameter values described in Table I while the other columns
contain proportional changes of those initial values. The parameters are the drift in logs (c), the persistence
of prot shocks (), the standard deviation of the innovation term (), the concavity of the production
function (), the operating costs (f), the capital depreciation rate (), the corporate income tax rate (),
the market cost of debt (rB), the market cost of equity (rS), and the growth rate (g).
37
Table V
Sensitivity Analysis of Real Options Value
The table shows the proportion of share price, eS0  eK0; eB0; z0, that is explained by the value of the
real options, eO0 (z0), for di¤erent values of model parameters. The column labeled Base Case contains
the base case parameter values described in Table I while the other columns contain proportional changes
of those initial values. The parameters are the drift in logs (c), the persistence of prot shocks (), the
standard deviation of the innovation term (), the concavity of the production function (), the operating
costs (f), the capital depreciation rate (), the corporate income tax rate (), the market cost of debt
(rB), the market cost of equity (rS), and the growth rate (g).
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Table VI
Sensitivity Analysis of Secular Growth Value
The table shows the proportion of share price, eS0  eK0; eB0; z0, that is explained by the value of long-run
growth, eG0 (z0), for di¤erent values of model parameters. The column labeled Base Case contains the base
case parameter values described in Table I while the other columns contain proportional changes of those
initial values. The parameters are the drift in logs (c), the persistence of prot shocks (), the standard
deviation of the innovation term (), the concavity of the production function (), the operating costs
(f), the capital depreciation rate (), the corporate income tax rate (), the market cost of debt (rB),




The table presents the values used to parameterize the dynamic dividend discount model for three di¤erent
SIC industries: Oil and Gas Extraction (OGE), Chemicals (C), and Printing and Publishing (PP). The
parameters are the drift in logs (c), the persistence of prot shocks (), the standard deviation of the
innovation term (), the concavity of the production function (), the operating costs (f), the capital
depreciation rate (), the corporate income tax rate (), the market cost of debt (rB), the market cost of
equity (rS), and the growth rate (g).
40
Table VIII
Cross-Sectional Value of Market Equity, Real Options, and Long-Run
Growth
The table exhibits the results of the dynamic dividend discount model for three di¤erent SIC industries.
The variables are the market value of equity with no real options and no future growth, eS0  eK0; eB0; z0
AP
;
the value of the real options, eO0 (z0); the value of long-run growth, eG0 (z0); the interaction term between
managerial exibility and growth, eI0 (z0); the market value of equity with managerial exibility and long-
run growth, eS0  eK0; eB0; z0; optimal next-period assets, eK1 (z0); optimal next-period debt, eB1 (z0);
current debt, eB0; and the market value of the rm, eB0 + eS0  eK0; eB0; z0.
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